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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court continued its trial over the
death penalty in three cases last term. The Justices
in the centrist plurality1 continue to try to force the
states to administer the death penalty rationally
while avoiding a sweeping constitutional holding
eliminating capital punishment.2 The result is a
series of decisions, including those noted here, in
which the Justices attempt to ensure substantive
fairness in the imposition of the death penalty
largely by setting procedural standards concerning
the manner in which it may be imposed.3
The pivotal opinion in the Court's present line
of death penalty cases is Furman v. Georgia.' In
Furman, the Court issued a five-to-four per curiam
decision holding the imposition of the death pen-
alty unconstitutional under the eighth and four-
'Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens are the core
members of the centrist plurality in death penalty cases.
These Justices tend to take moderate positions on a
variety of the issues presented in death penalty cases.
They are not able to find capital punishment to be cruel
and unusual under all circumstances as do Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nor would the
centrist group permit the states as much latitude in
determining when the death penalty is appropriately
imposed as would Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice,
and Justice White. Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759,
1772-73 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1773
(White, J., dissenting).
2 This option was rejected by a majority of the justices
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3 See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (pro-
hibiting the exclusion of hearsay evidence offered in
mitigation of death penalty); Presnell v. Georgia, 439
U.S. 14 (1978) (jury verdict failed to specify forcible or
statutory rape); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (the
range of mitigating factors which may be considered
under statute too limited); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (death penalty disproportionate penalty for
rape of an adult woman); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977) (death penalty sentencing based in part on
confidential information in presentence report); Davis v.
Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (juror excluded in violation
of standards of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968)).
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally Schwartz, Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of
William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 378 (1980).
teenth amendments in the three cases consolidated
under that name.5 Because there were nine separate
opinions, and no member of the majority joined
any other, the implications of Furman were less than
clear. The death penalty statutes of forty jurisdic-
tions6 were voided, but state legislatures received
little specific guidance about how to reform them.
Furman did not resolve the issue of whether the
death penalty was unconstitutional per se. Only
Justices Brennan and Marshall found capital pun-
ishment to be cruel and unusual under all circum-
stances. 7 The other three members of the Furman
majority argued that the death penalty was cruel
and unusual because of its infrequent or standard-
less administration.8 The dissenters found capital
punishment constitutional.9 As interpreted by the
Court's centrist plurality, Furman stands for the
proposition that "the penalty of death may not be
imposed under sentencing procedures that create
a substantial risk that the punishment will be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
''
In 1976, the Court reviewed five state death
penalty statutes enacted in response to Furman.11
The three statutes which were approved provided
the judge and the jury with standards guiding the
imposition of the death penalty and made provi-
sion for appellate review in those cases receiving a
capital sentence.' 2 The two statutes which were
struck down imposed mandatory penalties upon
5 408 U.S. at 239-40. Consolidated with Furman at 408
U.S. 238 were Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas.6 Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 417 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting).7 1d. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stew-
art, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting and joined by
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
0 Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 1764 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
15 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12 FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1) (Supp. 1976-77); GA. CODE
§§ 26-1101, 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
538
Vol. 71, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.
THE DEATH PENALTY
conviction." Because the five cases produced
twenty-four opinions with no single majority opin-
ion, the Court failed to develop a unified position
on most issues.
14
In Gregg v. Georgia,"5 the Court's position on
capital punishment became clearer as the centrist
plurality of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens
concluded that the death penalty is not cruel and
unusual per se. Justice White also joined the group
which was unable to find the death penalty to be
"cruel and unusual under all circumstances."' 6
Since the Chief Justice, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Rehnquist had earlier indicated their ina-
bility to find that the death penalty was unconsti-
tutional,' 7 the Court currently is divided seven-to-
two on whether the death penalty is not per se a
violation of the eighth amendment.
At the same time that most of the Justices are
unable to find a legal basis for abolishing the death
penalty, they clearly oppose it on moral grounds.
Their opinions are replete with statements dem-
onstrating abhorrence of the death penalty 8 and
their agony over the unique and final character of
such punishment.' 9 Thus, the cases handed down
last term were decided in the general context of the
Court's ambivalence toward the death penalty.
II. GODFREY V. GEORGIA
In Godfrey v. Georgia,2' the Court held unconsti-
tutionally vague, under both the eighth and four-
13 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (West 1974); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
"Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens determined the
outcome by voting with those opposing the death penalty
to overturn two statutes and with the remaining Justices
to uphold three others.
"s 428 U.S. at 187. Justice Powell had found the death
penalty constitutional in Furman, 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell,
J., dissenting).16 428 U.S. at 226.
17 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18 "If we were possessed of legislative power, I would
[vote to abolish capital punishment] ... or, at the very
least restrict [its] use.., to a small category of the most
heinous crimes." Id at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
"Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating
agony of the spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my
distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the
death penalty. . .." id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
is See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187 (Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, JJ., concurring) ("[D]eath as a pun-
ishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability.");
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., con-
curring) ("[D]eath is... an unusually severe punishment,
unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.");
id. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("I am not oblivious
to the fact that this is truly a matter of life and death.').
20 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980).
teenth amendments, the state's construction of a
provision of the Georgia Code permitting the death
sentence when it was found beyond a reasonable
doubt that a murder "was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated bat-
tery to the victim." 21 Godfrey received a jury-
imposed death sentence under section (b) (7) for the
shotgun slaying of his wife and mother-in-law,
although the murders did not involve torture or
aggravated battery.22 The Georgia Supreme Court
21 GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978). In addition to
(b)(7), Georgia Code, § 27-2534.1(b) provides nine ag-
gravating circumstances upon which the sentence of
death may be imposed. These are:
(1) The offense of murder.., was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony, or the offense of murder was committed by
a person who has a substantial history of serious
assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder ... was committed while
the offender was engaged in the commission of
another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the
offense of murder was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson
in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder... knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one
person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the
lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder
for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving
money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of ajudicial officer, former judicial
officer, district attorney or solicitor or former district
attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise
of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to
'commit murder or committed murder as an agent
or employee of another person....
(8) The offense of murder was committed against
any peace officer, corrections employee or fireman
while engaged in the performance of his official
duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a
person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful
custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confine-
ment.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of
avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful
arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement,
of himself or another.
100 S. Ct. at 1762.
" 100 S. Ct. at 1763-64. The killings followed several
emotionally charged days during which Mrs. Godfrey left
home, moved in with her mother and filed for divorce.
During the slayings Godfrey also struck his eleven-year-
old daughter on the head with a gun as she ran for help.
Following the killings in which both victims died in-
stantly, Godfrey called the local sheriff, explained what
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affirmed the trial court's judgment.23 Since the
issue before the Court concerned the vagueness of
the aggravating circumstances which justified the
imposition of the death penalty, and affected only
the sentencing part of Georgia's bifurcated pro-
ceeding, the Court allowed the conviction to
stand.24
In Gregg v. Georgia,2 the Court had refused to
find section (b)(7) unconstitutional on its face,
arguing that there was "no reason to assume that
the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an
open-ended construction" that any murder could
be said to involve "depravity of mind or an aggra-
vated battery. '" 26 In Godfrey, however, the plurality27
found no indication in the record that the jurors
had not held this view since they were given no
guidance "concerning the meaning of any of [sec-
tion] (b)(7)'s terms. ' ' 28 Nor was this "standardless
and unchanneled" imposition of the death sentence
cured by the Georgia Supreme Court's review of
the case, since that court did not act to limit the
construction of section (b)(7) to any particular
standard.29
Examining the facts and circumstances of the
murders, the plurality concluded that the Georgia
Supreme Court had not "applied a constitutional
construction of the phrase 'outrageously or wan-
he had done, and asked to be picked up. Godfrey later
told a police officer, "I've done a hideous crime ... but
I have been thinking about it for eight years... I'd do it
again." Id. at 1763.
23 Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
2 100 S. Ct. at 1767.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
26 Id. at 201 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., con-
curring). Gregg had not been sentenced under section
(b) (,7).
21,In Godfrey, Justice Blackmun joined the core mem-
bers of the plurality, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens. 100 S. Ct. at 1761.
28 Id. at 1765 (Opinion of Stewart, J.). Justice Stewart
approved the Georgia Supreme Court's efforts in previous
cases to limit the meaning of section (b)(7). These limits
were:
(1) that to be "outrageously or wantonly vile, hor-
rible or inhuman" the offense had to demonstrate
"torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated bat-
tery to the victim,"
(2) "that the phrase 'depravity of mind' compre-
hended only the kind of mental state that led the
murderer to torture or to commit an aggravated
battery before killing his victim," and
(3) "that the word, 'torture,' must be construed in
pan materia with 'aggravated battery' so as to require




tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they] in-
volved.., depravity of mind.' "" On the contrary,
Justice Stewart argued that Godfrey's crimes did
not "[reflect] a consciousness materially more 'de-
praved' than that of any person guilty of murder"
and concluded that "[t]here is no principled way
to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty
was imposed, from the many cases in which it was
not."
,31
In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, argued, as both have
since Furman, that the death penalty was under any
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment and
forbidden by the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.3 2 The two concurring Justices also joined in
the plurality's view that Georgia's constructi6n of
section (b)(7) was unconstitutionally vague under
Gregg v. Georgia.33Justice Marshall devoted the bulk
of his opinion to developing the argument that
even if the death penalty is not cruel and unusual
per se, the post-Gregg cases demonstrated "that the
effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of
that ultimate sanction is so plainly doomed to
failure that it-and the death penalty-must be
abandoned altogether."
34
In dissent,Justice White,joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, reviewed the facts of the case, noting the
gruesome aspects of the murders. Justice White
argued that the plurality "turned a blind eye to
the facts surrounding the murders" when it argued
that the Supreme Court of Georgia had adopted
an open-ended construction of the Georgia stat-
ute.35 The dissenters, casting the plurality in the
position of ruling on the reasonableness of charac-
terizing the murders as "vile, horrible or inhuman"
or as involving "depravity of mind," argued that
the Court ought not interfere with factfinders in




2 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
3 Id.
34 Id. at 1772. Justice Marshall argued that the Court
reviews petitions for certiorari raising "issues of non-
compliance with the strictures of Gregg and its progeny"
almost weekly. The Supreme Court has reversed numer-
ous state supreme court decisions upholding capital pun-
ishment because of undue discretion in the sentencing
procedures. Studies of the appellate review process in
various states indicate that there is an absence of objective
standards. Poverty and race continue to be important
factors determining who receives the death sentence, and
the death penalty, which has been imposed only three
times since Furman, has ceased to contribute to the goals
of unishment. Id. at 1770-71.




of the Georgia Supreme Court's performance of its
function of reviewing death penalty cases, includ-
ing those sentenced under section (b)(7), Justice
White concluded that the present case was not an
aberration. 7 Finally, he rejected the contention, as
he thought the Court had in Gregg, that the death
penalty cannot be fairly administered by "govern-
ment, created and run as it must be by humans."38
In his separate dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Burger took a similar view of the plurality's posi-
tion. Deriding the plurality's effort to minimize the
severity of Godfrey's offense, the Chief Justice ar-
gued that they have done nothing more than to
apply theirown standard for when a killing war-
rants a death sentence.s
III. BEcK v. ALABAMA
Beck was convicted of murder and received the
death penalty under an Alabama statute which
prohibited the jury in a trial for a capital offense
from considering a verdict of guilty of a lesser
included noncapital offense.' According to Beck's
version of the offense, his accomplice had unex-
pectedly struck and killed the victim during the
commission of a robbery in the victim's home. Beck
denied that he killed the man or that he intended
his death.41 The State of Alabama conceded that
on this testimony, and without the statutory pro-
37 Id. at 1779. In drawing this conclusion,Justice White
compared the facts of Godfrey with several cases in which
the Georgia Supreme Court had affirmed death sentences
imposed under section (b)(7). These included Ruffin v.
State, 243 Ga. 95, 252 S.E.2d 472, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
530 (1979), in which a child was executed with a shotgun
although no torture or aggravated battery was present,
McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577
(1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976), in which there
was substantial disfigurement of the victim, and Birt v.
State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248, cert denied, 429 U.S.
1029 (1976), in which, arguably with Mr. Godfrey's
mother-in-law, there was substantial torture of the victim.
100 S. Ct. at 1776. It should be noted that the plurality
characterized McCorquodale as" 'a horrifying torture-mur-
der.' "Id. at 1765 (quoting 428 U.S. at 201).
'1 100 S. Ct. at 1779. Justice White's view is that the
Georgia Supreme Court has reviewed cases involving the
construction of section (b)(7) in a "responsible and con-
sistent" fashion. Id. at 1778.
3Id. at 1772-73 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
4 Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980); ALA. CODE
§ 13-11-2(a) (1975) provides:
If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it shall fix the
punishment at death when the defendant is charged
by indictment with any of the following offenses
and with aggravation, which must also be averred
in the indictment, and which offenses so charged
with said aggravation shall not include any lesser
offenses.41100 S. Ct. at 2385.
hibition, Beck would have been entitled to have
the jury instructed on the lesser included offense of
felony murder.42 The Alabama procedure put the
jury to the choice of either acquitting Beck, who
by his own admission was guilty of a serious, violent
offense, or convicting him of a capital offense.3
The Alabama trial court refused to overturn the
jury-imposed death sentence.4 Both the conviction
and the death sentence were upheld by the Ala-
bama Court of Criminal Appeals. 45 The Alabama
Supreme Court denied review in a brief opinion
citing Jacobs v. State,4s which upheld the Alabama
death penalty statute against a similar challenge. 7
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Beck argued
that "in a case in which the evidence clearly estab-
lishes the defendant's guilt of a serious noncapital
crime . . ., forcing the jury to choose between
conviction on the capital offense and acquittal
creates a danger that it will resolve any doubts in
favor of conviction."48
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens noted the
nearly universal acceptance of the rule that the
defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction whenever the evidence warrants it.
49
Justice Stevens concluded that under the facts of
the case, the failure to give the jury the option of
convicting the defendant of a lesser included of-
fense would likely increase the risk of an unwar-
ranted conviction.50 However, Justice Stevens ac-
cepted neither Beck's contention that the risk of an
unwarranted conviction was increased by the Ala-
bama procedure, nor the State's opposite conten-
tion that such risk was decreased.51 Either outcome,
he argued, injected "irrelevant considerations into
the factfinding process . . . [and] introduc[ed] a
level of uncertainty and unreliability . . . that
421 Id. In noncapital cases the Alabama rule is that the
defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruc-
tion if" 'there is any reasonable theory from the evidence
which would support the position.' "Under this standard
the felony-murder instruction would have been given. Id.
n.5 (quoting Fulghum v. State, 291 Ala. 71, 75, 277 So.
2d 886, 890 (1973)).43 Id. at 2385.
44 Id. at 2386.
45Id. at 2385 n.3 (citing 365 So. 2d 985, 1000 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1978)).
4 361 So. 2d 640 (Ala. 1979), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1122
(1979).
47 Beck v. State, 365 So. 2d. 1006, 1007 (Ala. 1978).
4 Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. at 2387.
49 Id. at 2389.
50Id.
1Id. at 2390-92. Alabama argued that because the
jury is led to believe that its sentence is final, the jury is
more likely to acquit than to convict if there is anything
close to a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2390.
19801
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cannot be tolerated in a capital case." 52 In reversing
the Alabama Supreme Court, the majority also
refused to accept the state's arguments that the
problem was remedied either by the jury's third
option of refusing to return any verdict or by the
judge's use of the sentencing power to correct an
improper verdict.53
In their brief separate concurrences, Justices
Brennan and Marshall each reiterated his belief
that the death penalty violates the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, with Justice Marshall arguing that capital
punishment also violates the fourteenth amend-
ment. 54 With this standard reservation, Justice
Marshall joined in the majority's determination
that the Alabama prohibition of lesser included
offense instructions in capital cases was unconsti-
tutional.s
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Jus-
tice White, failed to reach the merits of the case.
Justice Rehnquist argued that the issue decided by
the majority had not been properly preserved by
the petitioner in his appeal to the Supreme Court
of Alabama, hence the Supreme Court lacked ju-
risdiction to decide it.56
IV. ADAMS V. TEXAs
Another area in which the Court has attempted
to produce procedural reform in capital cases is
jury selection. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,5 7 the Court
held that the state could not constitutionally im-
pose the death penalty under procedures which
removed from the jury all those who indicated
during voir dire examination that they had consci-
entious objections or were otherwise opposed to
capital punishment.s The Court reasoned that
both "[a] man who opposes the death penalty, no
less than one who favors it, can make the discre-
tionary judgment entrusted to him by the state and
can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror."5
Excluding all those who opposed capital punish-
ment, the Court feared, would "[produce] a jury
uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."
' 6
52 Id. at 2392. A recent Fifth Circuit opinion suggests
that the effect of Beck is to invalidate all death penalties
imposed under the Alabama statute whether or not the
defendant had undertaken to prove a lesser included
offense at his trial. Evans v. Britton, 628 F.2d 400 (5th
Cir. 1980).
53 Id. at 2392-93.
54 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2393-94 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
' Id. at 2394.
6 Id. at 2394-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
5 Id. at 519.
59Id.60 Id. at 521. In the Court's view, the jury is a link
[Vol. 71
The last case noted here, Adams v. Texas, is one
of the progeny of Witherspoon.62 The Court decided
whether the holding of Witherspoon was limited to
the pre-Furnan statutes or applied to the death
penalty statutes which were enacted in response to
Furman granting less discretion to judges and ju-
ries.63 Also, the Court attempted to define the line
marking how far a state can go in screening jurors
concerning their predilections on capital punish-
ment.
64
Adams was convicted of murdering a peace of-
ficer, which is a capital offense in Texas.rs The trial
judge imposed the death sentence as was manda-
tory under the jury's findings.6 On appeal to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Adams argued
that jurors had been excluded in violation of With-
erspoon.6 7 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
upheld Adams' conviction and sentence.rs
Texas trials for capital offenses are conducted in
two phases.'s The jury first decides the question of
guilt or innocence. 70 If the defendant is found
guilty, a separate sentencing proceeding is held at
which additional evidence in mitigation or aggra-
vation is presented. 71 Following this proceeding,
the jury is required to answer either two or three
questions based on evidence from either phase of
the proceedings. 72 If the jury answers each of the
between "contemporary values and the penal system." In
order to reflect contemporary values the jury must rep-
resent as broad a cross-section of the community as can
carry out jury functions. One of the consequences of
broadly excluding potential jurors opposed to capital
punishment would be to sever this nexus between the
jury and community values. This could result in the
continuation of capital sentences long after they were no
longer acceptable to the public generally. Id. at 519 n.15.
61 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980).
62 Id. at 2523.
63 Id. at 2525.
" Id. at 2528.
65 Id. at 2524.
66 Id.; TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 37.07 1(e)
(Vernon Supp. 1980).
67 100 S. Ct. at 2525.
6 Id. (citing 577 S.W.2d 717; 728 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979)).
6 100 S. Ct. at 2524.
70id
71 Id.
72 Under TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §
37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980) the jury must answer the
following questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would
result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would
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questions in the affirmative beyond a reasonable
doubt, the court is required to sentence the defend-
ant to death.73 Jurors in capital cases are required
to take an oath that their "deliberations on any
issue of fact" will not be affected by the fact "that
the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment
for life" will follow on conviction of a capital
felony.74
Justice White, writing for the majority in Adams,
concluded that Texas administration of section
12.31(b) was overbroad and had excluded
jurors whose only fault was to take their responsibil-
ities with special seriousness or to acknowledge hon-
estly that they might or might not be affected. It
does not appear in the record before us that these
individuals were so irrevocably opposed to capital
punishment as to frustrate the State's legitimate
efforts to administer its constitutionally valid death
penalty scheme.75
The Chief Justice concurred in the judgment
without writing or joining any opinion.76 Justices
Brennan and Marshall separately concurred with
their standard statements that the death penalty is
contrary to the eighth or the eighth and fourteenth
amendments, respectively.77
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that
instead of expanding the scope of Witherspoon, the
Court ought to reconsider its reasoning in view of
Furman and subsequent decisions in capital cases.
78
Justice Rehnquist noted the contrast between the
limited role played by the jury under Texas pro-
cedures and the conditions of "complete and un-
bridled" jury discretion which characterized the
jury in Witherspoon." Given the jury's lack of dis-
constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of
the defendant in killing the deceased was unreason-
able in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
73 100 S. Ct. at 2524.
74 Id.; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.31(b) (Ver-
non Supp. 1980) provides:
Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence
of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on
conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror
shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless
he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of
death or imprisonment for life will not affect his
deliberations on any issue of fact.
75 100 S. Ct. at 2529.
76 id.
77 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Marshall, J., con-
curing).78 Id at 2530.79 Id. In Witherspoon, the Court stated that "in Illinois
... the jury is given broad discretion to decide whether
or not death is 'the proper penalty' in a given case, and
ajuror's general views about capital punishment play an
inevitable role in any such decision." 391 U.S. at 519.
cretion under Texas law and the requirement that
it answer specific questions based on the evidence,
the dissent argued that there is "no reason why
Texas should not be entitled to require each juror
to swear that he or she will answer those questions
without regard to their possible cumulative conse-
quences."80
V. CONCLUSION
In Godfrey, the plurality restated its goal, first
formulated in Furman, of assuring a degree of ra-
tionality and uniformity in the circumstances un-
der which the death penalty is imposed.81 Unfor-
tunately, however, last term's cases failed to ad-
vance this goal. One of the major impediments to
a rational and uniform death penalty is the Court's
pattern, since Furman, of preferring to invalidate
death sentences on procedural rather than substan-
tive grounds.8 2 The Court's approach has been to
hold that a requirement of a constitutionally valid
procedure is the establishment of substantive stan-
dards identifying the circumstances when the death
penalty is appropriate83 Under the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers, the plurality
has relegated to the state legislatures the responsi-
bility of specifying the content of these standards.8
The state appellate courts, through their review of
cases receiving the death penalty, are supposed to
guarantee rational and uniform results which com-
port both with the legislatively defined standards
and the requirements of the Constitution.85
Last term's cases suggest that the Court's model
for attainment of a rational and uniform death
penalty breaks down in practice at nearly every
o 100 S. Ct. at 2531.
8 100 S. Ct. at 1764. The following is a representative
statement of this principle: "[I]f a State wishes to author-
ize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsi-
bility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids
the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death pen-
alt " Id.
There are a variety of substantive areas in which the
Court could establish standards short of abolishing the
death penalty entirely. Some examples are proportionality,
which concerns the suitability of the punishment to the
crime; uniformity, which concerns the similar treatment of
similarly situated offenders; and mitigation, which con-
cerns the identification of mitigating factors and the
statement of formulae for their use.
' See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 201 (Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
AId. at 175.
8 In Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (Stewart, Powell and
Stevens, JJ., concurring), the plurality argued that the
appellate review process would assure a punishment less
than death in a given case "[i]f a time comes when juries
generally do not impose the death penalty in a certain
kind of murder case."
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conceivable point. These cases demonstrate state
failures to devise sufficiently specific standards for
when the death penalty is appropriate. 86 State
appellate courts have failed to screen the cases
reviewed for uniformity and for the proportionality
of the punishment to the crime.8 7 Moreover, state
standards governing mitigating factors in punish-
ment are either nonexistent or given a limited role
in sentencing decisions.
88
In Godfrey, the Court found that the state of
Georgia failed to set a sufficiently precise standard
for when the death penalty could be imposed8 9
This finding implied both legislative failure to state
the standard with precision and judicial failure to
correct a potentially vague statute by means of a
narrowed construction. 9° Godfrey, however, illus-
trates several other weaknesses in the Court's model
for the achievement of uniformity and rationality.
Godfrey involved an emotionally motivated domes-
tic slaying for which death is an atypical sentence.
9 1
Yet this punishment did not run afoul of any
Georgia Supreme Court standard requiring like
treatment of similarly situated offenders. The ques-
tion remains unanswered whether the Georgia Su-
preme Court has no uniformity standards or has
simply failed to state them in these contexts.92
The Supreme Court has not steered the states
toward uniform administration of the death pen-
alty. The Court has not addressed the question of
whether the death sentence may be constitutionally
imposed for crimes for which it is a freakish pun-
ishment. Moreover, the Court has declined to re-
quire that the reviewing court compare nonap-
pealed capital cases in which the death penalty
was not imposed with reviewed cases in which it
was imposed. 93 This comparison is necessary to
identify deviant sentencing patterns.94 In order to
'6 See text accompanying notes 89-90 infra.7 See text accompanying notes 91-100 infra.
88 See text accompanying notes 10 1-106 infra.
89 100 S. Ct. at 1767.
90 Id. at 1765.
9' In Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 216, 232 S.E.2d 47, 52
(1977), the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged that
penalties less than death 2re frequently imposed in do-
mestic murder cases in that state.
9 Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68
GEO. L.J. 97 (1979).
" See generally, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 206
(Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
9 If the reviewing court only compares death penalty
cases to other death penalty cases, it may find some
comparable cases even when death is an extraordinary
sentence for a given crime. If there are 2,000 aggravated
armed robberies every year and five of them receive the
death penalty, the reviewing court can justify each death
achieve uniform and predictable imposition of cap-
ital punishment, the Court should require state
courts to identify the crimes for which death is an
unusual punishment and prohibit it for those
crimes.
Godfrey also raised the issue of proportionality.
Even if the death penalty is given more often than
rarely in emotionally provoked domestic slayings,
a question of the suitability of the puirishment to
the crime remains. In Godfrey, the question of pro-
portionality was not considered by the Georgia
Supreme Court; hence questions concerning the
nature of that court's proportionality standard are
raised by this failure.
95
As it has avoided other substantive questions
relating to the death penalty, the Court has ap-
proached the issue of proportionality with great
reluctance. The case of rape is an instructive ex-
ample. The Court refused to find death a dispro-
portionate penalty for rape in Maxwell v. Bishop,
96
resolving the case as a violation of Witherspoon
instead.9 7 It refused another invitation to consider
this question in Furman.9s In Coker v. Georgia,9 the
Court finally held that death was a disproportion-
ate penalty for rape of an adult woman. Fortu-
nately, during the seven-year period between Max-
well and Coker, no executions occurred, so that none
of the death row inmates whose sentences were
ultimately affected by Coker have been executed."°
Furthermore, Godfrey suggests a gap between the
Court's model and reality on the issue of the role
of mitigating circumstances in the sentencing pro-
cess.'
01 The trial judge's report to the Georgia
Supreme Court indicated in mitigation that God-
frey had no significant history of prior offenses.i
°2
The record does not indicate whether the trial
sentence by comparing it to the other four and to the five
from the year before and so on without ever having to
acknowledge that death is a highly atypical penalty for
the crime and that in 995 identical cases sentences less
than death were imposed.
95 Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
96 398 U.S. 262 (1970).9
7t. at 266.
98 408 U.S. at 456-61 (Powell, J., dissenting). Two of
the cases consolidated in Furman were rape cases. Id
99 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
100 For a discussion of the litigation strategy which was
in large part responsible for producing and maintaining
the moratorium on executions in the 1960s and 70s. See
M. ML-TNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (1973).
i0i This is in contrast to the standards the Court has
imposed for the consideration of aggravating circum-
stances. See Davis, The Death Penalty and the Current State of
the Law, 14 CRiM. L. BULL. 7, 9-11 (1978).
'2 100 S. Ct. at 1764 n.4.
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court considered the emotional provocation for the
killings, Godfrey's low probability of recidivism, or
his previous history of mental depression. °'a The
Georgia legislature has not identified the mitigat-
ing factors trial courts must consider in death
penalty cases, nor has the Georgia Supreme Court
devised such standards."o
The Supreme. Court has required that a wide
range of evidence in mitigation be considered be-
fore the death sentence may be imposed. 0 5 How-
ever, the Court has failed to go beyond this proce-
dural requirement to demand that a state be con-
sistent among defendants in its identification and
weighing of mitigating factors. The Court has
never attempted to identify and provide even a
simple formula for deciding how to weigh individ-
ual mitigating factors06
In Beck, the Court held that due process required
lesser included offense instructions in capital of-
fenses.10 7 This holding does not, however, eliminate
questionable procedures in Alabama death sen-
tencing. In arriving at its advisory verdict on the
issue of sentence, the Alabama jury in capital cases
considers no evidence in mitigation. 06 If the jury
decides that the death sentence shall be imposed,
the trial judge hears evidence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. The judge makes the
final sentencing determination between life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole or
death. 0 9 An Alabama judge has noted, however,
that -reducing a jury's sentence of death to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole may be
unpopular. Hence trial judges are reluctant to
deviate from the sentence returned by the jury. n°
This practice presents the question whether consid-
eration of mitigating circumstances in Alabama
comports with the Court's holdings in Bell v. Ohio
and Lockett v. Ohio."'
Although the Court decided Adams on the
103 Godfrey's history of mental illness is discussed in his
Supreme Court brief. Brief for Petitioner at 22, 23, God-
frey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980).
r. Dix, supra note 92, at 119-20, argues that ifanithing
the Georgia Supreme Court has inconsistent standards.
105 See relevant eases in note 3 supra.
106 Possible formulations might be that the death pen-
alty is not permitted when one or more of a specified set
of mitigating factors are present, or when more mitigating
than aggravating factors are present.
"07 100 S. Ct. 2384.
" Id. at 2385.
09 Id. at 2385 n.4 (citing ALA. CODE § 13-11-3 (Supp.
1979)).
"o Id. at 2393 n.22.
". Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
ground that jurors were excluded in violation of
Witherspoon, Texas sentencing procedures are ques-
tionable on other grounds. Particularly, the statu-
tory questions that the jury is required to answer
may limit unduly the relevance of many factors
traditionally considered in mitigation." 2 If thejury
in sentencing in a Texas case find.4 considerations
such as youth or mental illness, the mitigating
effect of these considerations is nonexistent if they
do not require negative answers to any of the
special questions.
As this recitation of the unaddressed problems
in last term's cases suggests, uniformity and ration-
ality in the administration of the death penalty
remain elusive goals. Further problems are difficult
and are unresolved by the Court's narrow proce-
dural approach to death penalty cases.
If the executions which resumed in 1977 con-
tinue, the Court will be under increasing pressure
to decide substantive issues pertaining to the death
penalty."3 Questions which the Court would rather
not address will become more difficult to evade if
execution appears imminent. The Court's ap-
proach will become difficult to maintain as cases
which present only substantive questions, such as
proportionality or uniformity, or cases in which the
statute's procedural problems have been identified
and corrected are presented to the Court.
Moreover, if state courts generally fail to for-
mulate and enforce substantive standards for the
imposition of the death penalty, thus failing to
carry out their role in the Court's model, the
Court's policy of considering only procedural issues
will become increasingly difficult to justify."4 Sim-
ilarly, if research performed after Furman demon-
strates that race remains an important determinant
of the death penalty even when the circumstances
of the offense and relevant mitigating and aggra-
'2 See note 72 supra.
"3 The fact that there have bebn so few executions in
recent years makes the selection of a few to die out of the
hundreds of equally deserving death row inmates appear
irrational and unjust. The absence of a principled selec-
tion process is particularly acute when, as recently, two
out of three inmates executed were simply persons who
refused to appeal their sentences. See Lenhard v. Wolff,
443 U.S. 1306 (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012
(1976). Thus, the infrequency of executions poses an
ironic problem for the Court since they must increase or
cease entirely for the system to appear rational and just.
Infrequency of execution also undermines one of the
major justifications for the death penalty, its supposed
deterrent value. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 313.
"4 This is the conclusion of Dix's detailed study of the
sentencing review process in Georgia, Florida and Texas,
supra note 92.
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vating factors are taken into account," 5 the Justices
will be hard-pressed to avoid setting substantive
standards for death penalty administration.
Whether the Court can formulate and effectively
"5 This process is under way. A quick and dirty com-
parison of the proportion of blacks on death row who
were convicted before and after Furman does not reveal
any major reduction. Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition
of the Death Penalty, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 261, 262 (1976). Of
course, the system could change without reducing the
proportion of blacks on death row but a shift in that
statistic might be one indicator of such change.
administer substantive standards remains to be
seen. Two members of the Court have already
determined "that the effort to eliminate arbitrari-
ness in the infliction of [capital punishment] is so
plainly doomed to failure that it-and the death
penalty-must be abandoned altogether." justices
Brennan and Marshall may be correct. If the plu-
rality is committed to its stated goal of eliminating
the random and freakish nature of the imposition
of the death penalty, abolition may be the only
effective means available.
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